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SUPREME COURT OF UTA!~ 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
ORVILLE RALPH COATES and 
DONNA COATES, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
-vs-
AMERICAN ECONOMY INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
* * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
* * * * * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 17026 
This is an action wherein plaintiffs seek survivor 
benefits, funeral expenses and medical expenses under the 
Personal Injury Protection Endorsement provided in an auto-
mobile insurance contract between the plaintiffs and the 
defendant. 
-1-
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court in the First District court of Box 
Elder County granted the plaintiff's aotion for summary 
Judgment against the defendant for survivor benefits, funeral 
expenses and medical costs. The trial court held that 
under the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act it is not 
necessary for the injured person to be occupying a motor 
vehicle as defined in the No-Fault Act but concluded that 
where at least one of the vehicles involved in an accident 
is a motor vehicle as defined in the Act, the injuries were 
covered by the insurance required under the ~10-Fault Act. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks an affirmation of the trial 
court's ruling that the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance 
Act, Section 31-41-1 et seq., u.c.A. (1953 as amended), as 
applied to the particular facts of this case requires 
insurance coverage and benefits for these plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs also request that the case be remanded to the 
trial court for an additional award of attorney fees incurred 
on appeal. 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs-Respondents accept the facts as set forth 
in the Appellant's Brief, for the reason that the facts 
were stipulated to by the parties. 
AR GU ME UT 
POINT I 
THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF UTAH HAS 
EVIDENCED A CLEAR INTENT THAT IN THIS TYP~ 
OF ACCIDENT THE UTAH AUTOMOBILE NO-FAULT 
INSURANCE ACT §31-41-1 ET SEQ, U.C.A. (1953 
AS AMENDED) SHOULD APPLY. 
In Originally enacting the "Utah Automobile No-Fault 
Act, Utah Code Anno. §31-41-1 et seq. (1953 as aQended) 
the State Legislature set forth as the primary purpose 
of this legislation the following: 
"The purpose of this act is to require 
the payment of certain prescribed benefits 
in respect to motor vehicle accidents 
through either insurance or other 
approved security but on the basis of 
no fault, preserving, however, the right 
of an injured person to pursue the cus-
tomary tort claims where the most serious 
types of injuries occur." Utah Code 2\nno. 
§ 31-41-2 (1953 as amended) . 
-3-
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The act next sets forth certain definitions of terms 
(see §31-41-3 U.C.A. (1953 as amended)). The act then 
requires evP.ry owner of a motor vehicle to provide either 
insurance or some other approved security as defined by 
the act or as approved by the Utah insurance department. 
(See §31-41-4 and §31-41-5 U.C.A. (1953 as amended)). 
Utah Code Anno. §31-41-6 (1953 as amended) then provides: 
"-(1) Every insurance policy or other 
security complying with the requirements 
of subsection (1) of section 31-41-5 shall 
provide personal injury protection providing 
for payments to the insured and to all other 
persons suffering personal injury arising 
out of an accident involvin an motor 
vehicle. emphasis added 
The legislature next determined the types of recipients 
covered under the Act. In U.C.A. $31-41-7 the act provides: 
"(l) The coverages described in section 
31-41-6 shall be applicable to: 
(a) Personal injuries sustained by the 
insured when injured in an accident in 
this state involvin motor vehicle. 
(b) Persona 1n)ur1es arising out o 
automobile accidents occurring in this 
state sustained by any other natural person 
while occupying the described motor vehicle 
with the consent of the insured or while a 
pedestrian if injured in an accident in-
volving the described motor vehicle. 
(emphasis added) 
Thus in reading nll of this legislation. together there 
aro two classes or categories of people who are covered by 
the No-Fault ~ct. 
-4-
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First, there is the insured (which is a defined term 
meaning the naMed insured ... or other relative who reside(s) 
in the same household (see u.c.A. S31-41 -3(4)) who is 
injured in an accident in this state involving any motor 
vehicle. 
Second, are those injured people such as passengers 
occupying the described motor vehicle with the consent 
of the insured, or pedestrians if injured in an accident 
involving the described motor vehicle. 
~s will be shown later, the recognition of these 
separata categories of people entitled to no-fault benefits 
sssists in understanding why the 1975 amendment to the 
No-Fault ~ct does not disqualify the plaintiffs from coverage 
under the l\ct. 
It is the respondents' position that under U.C.A. 
§31-41-6(1) and 31-41-7(1) (a) (1953 as amended) that the 
plaintiffs only need show three (3) elements to be entitled 
to their no-fault benefits. These three elements are: 
(1) was Brent ~alph Coates an "eligible insured person"; 
( 2) did Brent Ralph Coates receive "bodily injuries"; and 
(3) was nrent Ralph Coates injured in an accident involving 
any motor vehicle. 
-5-
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Since the stipulated facts agree that Brent Ralph Coates 
was an "eligible insured person" and Brent Ralph Coates did 
receive "bodily injuries", the only question before this 
court is whether or not his injuries were caused by an 
accident involving any motor vehicle. 
"Motor vehicle" is a defined term pursuant to the 
insurance contract and pursuant to Utah State law. The 
statute defines motor vehicle as "any vehicle of a kind 
required to be registered under Title 41, but excluding, 
however, motorcycles. 
Assuming that the motorcycle .~1r. Coates was operatinq 
(even though not owned by him) would be excluded from 
coverage, the fact remains that Mr. Coates was injured in 
an accident involving the use of a motor vehicle, that motor 
vehicle being the motor vehicle operated by Ferris Reeder. 
This point was clearly understood by the trial court 
who noted that this accident involved two vehicles. While 
it is clear that the Coates' youth was occupying and riding 
upon a motorcycle, the defendant-appellant fails to under-
stand that Ferris Reeder was operating a motor vehicle, 
and his motor vehicle is not excluded, and his motor vehicle 
caused the accident and injuries. Thus, under §31-41-6(1) 
-6-
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and §31-41-7(1) (a) the plaintiffs-respondents are entitled 
to coverage under their own policy because: 
"Personal injuries [were] sustained by an 
insured when injured in an accident in 
this State involving any motor vehicle. 
The appellants argue that the 1975 Legislature clearly 
intended to deny any no-fault benefits to motorcycle occu-
pants in enacting an amendment to the No-Fault Act. However, 
neither the language of the amendment nor the debate sur-
rounding the enactment of the amendment suggests such a 
result was desired, let alone achieved. 
Prior to 1975 the term "pedestrian" meant: 
"any natural person not occupying or 
riding upon a motor vehicle." 
All the 1975 amendment did was to add the following 
language to the definition of a pedestrian: 
"excluding, however, any natural person 
occupying or riding upon a motorcycle." 
Thus as previously pointed out of the two categories 
of people entitled to benefits ("the insured person and. 
his covered relatives injured in an accident involving 
any motor vehicle" and "non-insured occupants or pedestrians 
injured in an accident involving the insured motor vehicle") 
the amendment merely dealt with defining "pedestrians" 
injured in an accident involving an insured motor vehicle. 
-7-
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The reasons for this amendment were well articulated 
by the witnesses, senators and representatives who parti-
cipated in the debate. 
The people who testified talked of the inequality of 
allowing a motorcycle operator who did not choose to purchase 
no-fault or medical payment provisions on his motorcycle 
to then be able to collect no-fault benefits on the policy 
of a motor vehicle owner whose vehicle was involved in an 
accident with a motorcycle. 
Senator Wilford Black [D] Salt Lake County, sponsored 
Senate Bill 45, the proposed amendment, and stated that 
the reason for the amendment was to prevent a motorcycle 
operator who wasn't insured from having a "free ride" 
on the insurance policy of an automobile driver who had 
no-fault and whose vehicle was involved in an accident. 
Mr. Melvin Summerhays of the Utah State Insurance 
Commissioners Office testified on February 4, 1975 before 
the State Senate on Senate Bill 45 and again stated that 
the purpose of the bill was to prevent motorcycle operators 
who were not insured from collecting as "pedestrians" on 
an automobile owners policy. Mr. Summerhays stated: 
"Now what we didn't anticipate and I'm 
sure the legislature didn't anticipate 
that we were making the motorcyclist the 
-8-
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same as a pedestrian and in making him a 
pedestrian, we gave him something for 
nothing ..• In other words, if he was in an 
accident with your vehicle now, if he was 
at fault or otherwise, he can run in to 
your car when you're sitting still and he 
has the benefits of your No-Fault Policy 
as a pedestrian ..• so that the real intent 
of this amendment we are talking about is 
to take the motorcyclist out of the pedes-
trian classification ..• " 
Following several questions, Mr. Summerhays again 
reiterated that the purpose of the amendment was to exclude 
motorcyclists from the definition of pedestrian. 
No one spoke in favor of nor did anyone mention that 
§31-41-7(1) (a) which provides benefits when a policy holder 
or his immediate relatives who are covered by his policy 
are involved in an accident involving any motor vehicle 
should be denied coverage under this amendment. 
Mr. Carl Halbert and Mr. Keith McCune, insurance 
representatives, also spoke regarding the amendment. 
Again they stated.that their sole purpose in urging the 
passage was to keep a motorcyclist who does not elect to 
insure himself under no-fault or under a medical payment 
policy from getting free coverage as a pedestrian under an 
automobile owners policy. They both testified that if a 
motorcyclist chose to do so, he could voluntarily buy a 
medical benefits and disability benefits policy. 
-9-
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In concluding the debate, Senator Black reiterated 
the reasons for his sponsorship of the Amendment and 
claimed that the present situation allowing motorcyclists 
"who are not paying a dollars worth of insurance towards 
personal injury protection" to claim benefits as pedestrians 
was highly unfair and that the Amendment should be adopted. 
The Senate subsequently adopted the proposed Amendment. 
The proposed .7-\.rnendment was next considered by the 
Utah House of Representatives wherein it was debated on 
February 12, 1975. Representative James Hansen, (R] Davis 
County, was the leading advocate for its passage before 
the House. Representative Hansen explained that all the 
bill was doing "was to take the motorcyclist out of the 
definition of a pedestrian". 
Representative Hansen went on to explain that since 
a motorcyclist would not pay any "no-fault" premiums 
they should not be entitled to "free" benefits by being 
covered as pedestrians under a motor vehicle owner's 
policy. Mr Hansen further stated that if a motorcyclist 
desired to do so: 
"He can go to an [insurance] company and 
he can purchase insurance: liability, 
medical, collision, comprehensive - what-
ever it is he wants to purchase for his 
own individual requirements and that is 
the reason behind the change in this 
no-fault bill." 
-10-
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Again, no one suggested that the first category of 
people as defined in 31-41-7(1) (a) should be denied 
coverage. As to this category of people to-wit those 
who purchase no-fault benefits and are injured in an 
accident "involving any motor vehicle" the 1975 Amendrl'\ent 
left all coverages and benefits intact. 
The House passed the Amendment and it becam~ effective 
on !-1ay 13 , 19 7 5 . 
If the legislature really intended all motorcyclists 
to be "free game" and totally excluded from all no-fault 
benefits they could have done so very easily by amending 
§31-41-7 (1) (a) to read: 
"(l) The coverages described in Section 
31-41-6 shall be applicable to: 
(a) Personal injuries sustained by 
the insured when injured in an accident 
in this State involving any Motor vehicle, 
[unless the insured is occupying or riding 
upon a rrtotorcycle] ." 
Since all the legislature did was to change the 
definition of a pedestrian it is clear there was no 
legislative intent to deny benefits to insured people 
who were injured in an accident involving any motor vehicle. 
-11-
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POINT II 
THE BASIC PURPOSE OF THE NO-FAULT 
ACT WOULD BE THWARTED IF THIS COURT 
DENIES COVERAGE TO THE PLAINTIFFS. 
The basic purpose of the Utah Automobile No-Fault 
Act is stated as follows: 
"The purpose of this act is to require 
the payment of certain prescribed bene-
fits in respect to motor vehicle accidents 
through either insurance or other approved 
security but on the basis of no fault, 
preserving, however, the right of an injured 
person to pursue the customary tort claims 
where the most serious types of injuries 
occur." 
While it was the intention of the legislature to effectuate 
certain savings in automobile insurance rates, it is clear 
that the main purpose was to afford insurance coverage for 
certain prescribed benefits irregardless of fault. 
The plaintiffs and any similarly situated citizens 
of this state really have no way to insure against the risk 
of injury to their son other than through their own no-fault 
policy. 
Since their son was only test driving a motorcycle, 
there was no way they could have purchased an insurance 
policy to cover the risks. If their son had owned the 
motorcycle and had failed to obtain coverage, both tpe 
-12-
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policy of insurance and the state statutes would have 
excluded coverage on a motor vehicle owned but not insured. 
(See U.C.A. §31-41-10 (1953 as amended)}. Thus the only way 
to insure that medical payments and other benefits would be 
available would be to rule that the provisions of the act 
apply under this factual situation. 
The appellants would apparently concede that had 
the plaintiff's son been injured in an accident involving 
Mr. Reeder's vehicle they would pay except for the fact 
he was on a motorcycle. Thus had 3rent Coates been riding 
on a bicycle, unicycle, skate board, horse, donkey or 
elephant or any other means except a motorcycle he would 
have had protection. The appellants urge that though 
the plaintiffs purchased a no-fault policy as required 
by law and even though their son was injured and died in 
an accident involving a motor vehicle, just because he was 
on a motorcycle no benefits are available. 
It is suggested that such a result is contrary to 
the purpose behind this ~ct. 
The respondents, also, claim that a denial of coverage 
would vitiate the contractual agreement between plaintiffs 
and defendants. 
-13-
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The insurance policy in effect provided: 
"The Company agrees with the named insured, 
subject to all of the provisions in this 
endorsement and to all of the provisions 
of the policy except as modified herein, 
as follows: 
SECTION 1 
PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE 
The Company will pay personal injury protec-
tion benefits to or on behalf of each 
eligible injured person for: 
(a) medical expenses, 
(b) work loss, 
(c) funeral expenses, and 
(d) survivor loss 
with respect to bodily injury sustained 
by an eliiible injured person caused by an 
accident involvin the use of a motor vehicle 
as a motor vehicle." emphasis a ded see 
R.38 for copy of the insurance policy.) 
Thus as previously pointed out, if the plaintiffs can 
show three· (3) elements, they are entitled to insurance 
coverage. These three elements are: (1) was Brent Ralph 
Coates an "eligible insured person"1 (2) did Brent Ralph 
Coates receive "bodily injuries"1 and (3) was Brent Ralph 
Coates injured in an accident involving the use of a motor 
vehicle as a motor vehicle. 
since he was an "eligible insured person" and he 
received "bodily injuries" and he was injured in an accident 
I 
involving a motor vehicle (the Reeder vehicle), the plaintiffs 
are entitled to coverage under their own policy. 
-14-
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If it could be considered that the insurance policy 
is unclear as to whether the basic benefits should apply, 
it is pointed out that Utah law clearly provides that 
automobile insurance policies must be construed to resolve 
doubts or uncertainties against the insurer which prepared 
and issued the policy. See Commercial Credit Corp. v. 
Premier Insurance Co. 12 Utah 2d 321, 366 P2d 476 (1961); 
see, also, American Cas. Co. of Redding Pa. v. Sta.r Ins. Co. 
Ltd. 568 P2d 731 (Utah 1977) • 
Thus, even if there existed an uncertainty as to 
whether a rider of a motorcycle hit by another Motor vehicle 
would be covered, all uncertainties would have to be resolved 
in favor of the insured. 
POINT III 
IDHE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED CASES 
FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS IN INTERPRETING 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH AUTOMOBILE 
NO-FAULT INSURANCE ACT. 
Cases involving factual circumstances similar to the 
present case have been decided in a number of foreign 
jurisdictions. The vast majority of courts considering 
this question have ruled that no-fault benefits were payable 
-15-
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to the injured party occupying a motorcycle. 
The defendant cites the case of Speakman v State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 402 Atlantic 2d 123 
(Md.1979) as purported authority for denial of coverage. 
That case has two major differences from the case 
before this court. In the Speakman case the injured party 
was operating his 2!!!! motorcycle. As an owner, he could 
insure his own vehicle if he had so desired, and thus 
prot.ected himsel·f from the risk of injury. 
Mr. Brent Coates did not 2!!!!. the motorcycle he 
was riding. He inspected the motorcycle at Vesco's Sport 
Center and apparently requested to take it for a test drive. 
After traveling approximately 11 blocks northbound on Main 
Street, he was struck by the Ferris Reeder vehicle and 
killed. Thus, Mr. Brent Coates had no opportunity to insure 
himself other than the general coverage of his parent's 
policy. 
Had the Speakman case occurred in Utah under the same 
facts as it did in Maryland and if the owner was insured by 
the same policy as the Coates were, the same result should 
have been reached in Utah as was reached in Maryland. This 
is due to the first exclusion listed in the Coates policy 
which states: 
-16-
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Exclusions 
This coverage does not apply: 
(a) to bodily injury sustained by any 
person while occupying a motor 
vehicle which is owned by the named 
insured and which is not an insured 
motor vehicle." (Emphasis added) 
The fact that Brent Ralph Coates was operating a 
motorcycle not owned by his parents or himself makes 
a great difference. 
The second major difference is that the Speakman 
case was really a determination of the Statutes of the 
State of Maryland. In fact the court clearly defined 
the issue as follows: 
"The appellant's automobile insurance policy 
included the following proviso with respect 
to PIP coverage: 
'THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY 
UNDER: 
(j) COVERAGE P TO ANY PERSON WHO: 
. . 
(4) SUSTAINS BODILY INJURY ARISING 
OUT OF THE OWNERSHIP, MAINTENANCE 
OR USE OF A MOTOR CYCLE OR MINI BIKE;' 
The issue is whether under the Maryland 
Insurance Cod~, the appellee could 
legally make such an exclusion." 
The Maryland Court concluded that such an exclusion 
was valid for an "owned" motorcycle. The insurance policy 
between the Coates and American Economy Insurance had no 
-17-
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such exclusion and thus the Speakman case is not really 
in point or even authority to support defendant's position. 
The defendant-appellant cites the cases of Heglin v 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 366 A. 2d 345 (N. J. 
App. 1976) and Harlan v. Fidelity & Casualty Com12any, 353 
A.2d 151 (N.J. App.1976). Both of these cases dealt with 
factual circumstances similar to the present case, in both 
the court ruled that no-fault benefits were payable. Appel-
lant attempts to dismiss these cases on the assertion that 
they really involve conflicts between the language of the 
policy and the language of the applicable statutes. Appellant 
fails to even note the most recent case decided by the 
New Jersey Court, that being Gerber v Allstate Insurance 
£2..:_1 391 A.2d 1285 (N.J. App. 1978). In that case at page 
1287 the court stated the following: 
" .•• the fact that the injured insured is 
driving a motorcycle at the time of the 
accident does not in itself justify the 
denial of coverage." 
(Heglin and Harlan cases cited) 
"From both of the above cases it is apparent 
that in order for an insured under an auto-
mobile policy to receive PIP benefits, the 
accident need only be one involving an auto-
mcbile, even thou h the insured himself is 
driving a non-qua 1 y ng Emp asis 
added) 
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Thus the New Jersey Court on three separate occasions has 
consistently held that under facts similar to the present 
case, benefits were payable. 
The trial court cited the case of Shoemaker v. National 
Ben Franklin of Michigan, 259 N.W.2d 414 (Mich. App.1977). 
Appellant makes the rash statement that it is beyond 
appellant's capacity to understand or explain how the 
Shoemaker case supports the trial court's ruling. The 
Shoemaker case involved a plaintiff who was injured 
while riding a motorcycle which collided with a farm 
tractor on a public highway. The plaintiff brought suit 
to recover no-fault benefits from his automobile insurance 
company. The trial court granted defendant's Motion For 
Summary Judgment and the appellate court ruled as follows: 
"For an insurer to incur liability under 
(the statute) there must at a minimum be 
an accident involving a vehicle intended 
to be covered by (the statute)." 
The clear implication of the Shoemaker ruling is 
that if either one of the vehicles involved in the collision 
had been a "motor vehicle" as defined by statute, then 
benefits would have been recoverable. 
Appellant concedes that the later Michigan case of 
Piersante v. American Fidelity Fire Insurance Company, 278 
N. w. 2d 691 (Mich. App. 1979), substantially supports the 
trial court's decision in the present case. Appeilant 
-19-
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asserts that the statutory provisions relied upon in the 
Piersante case were substantially different from the 
Utah Statutes, but appellant makes no effort to demonstrate 
the differences. The Michigan Statute was similar to Utah's 
in that it defined "motor vehicle" in such a way as to 
exclude motorcycle. Additionally, the Michigan statute 
required payment of benefits for injury arising out of the 
use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. The Michigan 
Court stated: 
"This provision does not require that the 
insured be the driver of the motor vehicle 
involved in the accident. It only required 
that the injury arise out of the operation 
of a motor vehicle •••• 
In the present case, plaintiff's injury arose 
out of the operation of the motor vehicle 
with which he collided. Unlike the situation 
in Shoemaker, the vehicle with which he 
collided was required to be and ·was insured 
under (the statute)." 
Based upon this reasoning the court ruled that the 
defendant insurer must pay no-fault benefits to the plaintiff. 
The trial court's opinion cited the Florida case of 
Negron v. The Travelers Insurance Company, 282 S.2d 28 (Fla. 
App. 1973). In its Brief appellant again rashly states 
that it is unable to explain how Negron is applicable here. 
In Negron· the plaintiff was operating a vehicle (a tractor 
trailer owned by the United States Postal Service) not 
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defined as a "motor vehicle" by the Florida No-Fault Statute. 
Plaintiff's vehicle was involved in a collision with a notor 
vehicle. The Florida Court held that Negron's personal 
automobile insurance policy must pay no-fault benefits 
to him because the accident involved a "motor vehicle". 
"There is no question that under the 
statement of facts the plaintiff's injury 
was caused by physical contact between a 
postal tractor-trailer and a motor vehicle." 
The Negron case then, stands for the principal that 
only one "motor vehicle" need be involved in the collision 
for no-fault coverage to apply. 
Finally, appellant cites the Florida case of Long 
Island Insurance Company v. Frank, 328 s.2d 542 (Fla. App. 
1976) • That case involved the question of whether or not 
the plaintiff might recover personal injury protection 
benefits from his own no-fault automobile insurance carrier 
as a result of injuries sustained while operating a motor-
cycle which collided with a motor vehicle. Appellant is 
correct in stating that the Florida Court held in favor 
of the insurance company, but appellant fails to advise 
this court that the reason for the holding was an inter-
pretation of the Florida Statute. The applicable Florida 
Statute required the insurer of a motor vehicle to pay 
personal protection benefits for 
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"accidental bodily injury sustained in 
this state by the owner while operating 
a motor vehicle, or while not an occupant 
of a motor vehicle or motorcycle, if the 
injury is caused by physical contact with 
the motor vehicle." 
The court ruled against the plaintiff because he was 
clearly occupying a motorcycle at the time of the collision. 
Appellant has spent much time talking about legislative intent. 
If the Utah Legislature intended to exclude motorcyclists in 
all cases, it could have done so by adopting language similar 
to the Florida Statute. The Utah Legislature did not do this, 
and appellant stretches the imagination to the breaking point 
by asking the court to rule that the Utah Legislature 
"intended" the same result as the Florida Statute even 
though it did not use that language. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondents respectfully suggest that the language 
of the Utah Automobile No-Fault Act requires payment of 
the prescribed benefits for an insured who is injured 
in an accident involving any motor vehicle. The 1975 
legislature in amending the definition of pedestrian did 
not change that result. 
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The basic policy of allowing a person to insure 
against the risks of injuries arising out of Motor vehicle 
usage would be tlwarted, unless the plaintiffs receive 
coverage under this policy. 
The decisions of other appellate courts have consis-
tently afforded coverage under the same factual situations 
which existed in this case. 
It is therefore urged that the trial court's decision 
be affirmed and that pursuant to U.C.\. J31-41-8 (1953 
as amended) that the case be remanded for a deter~ination 
of attorney fees and interest. 
1980. 
Respectfully submitted this -25!!_ day of September, 
MANN, HADFIELD AND THORNE 
Ben H. !Iadfield 
Attorneys for Plaint ff-Respondent 
35 First Security Bank Building 
P. o. Box "F" 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
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